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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a product liability case involving an allegedly defective set of electrode pads that

burned Appellant Linda Black ("Black") during electrical stimulation therapy at Superior Physical
Therapy in Idaho Falls. (R. Vol. I, pp. 9-11.) Black's argument below essentially was that because
Black was burned the electrode pads were defective. (Id., pp. 112-13, 214.) 1 While Black tried to
create an issue of fact by relying on affidavits by her physical therapist, Bart McDonald, the
District Court properly ruled he was not qualified under I.R.E. 702 to testify that the electrode pads
were defective.
Respondents DJO Global, Inc., EMPI, DJO Global, Inc. d/b/a EMPI, DJO, LLC,
(collectively, "EMPI")2 filed a motion for summary judgment on August 29, 2019 on the basis that
there was no evidence the electrodes were defective. (R. Vol. I, p. 40.)
The District Court agreed and ruled and entered judgment against Black. The District Court
also found that (a) Black's expert witness Bart McDonald ("McDonald") (the physical therapist
who treated Black) was unqualified under IRE 702 to opine on either a design or manufacturing
defect3 and (b) that Black could not prove her case through res ipsa loquitur. (R. Vol. I., pp. 163169.)

1

See Answer to Interrogatories 13 and 14: "[W]hen the product is used per the manufacturer's instructions and the
users get burned, the product is defective" and "any design that resulting [sic] in customers getting burned is
defective."
2
Respondents are collectively referred to as "EMPI'' because DJO Global Inc., d/b/a EMPI, manufactured and sold
the self-adhesive Carbon Electrodes used on Black. (R. Vol. I, p. 43.)
3
Black did not show that McDonald had any experience or knowledge in the design and manufacture of electrode
pads or medical devices in general.
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The District Court entered judgment dismissing Black's complaint with prejudice on
October 17, 2019.
Black filed a motion to reconsider on October 31, 2019, (id., p. 173), which the District
Court denied on January 9, 2020. (Id., p. 214.) The District Court again ruled that McDonald was
not qualified to testify that the electrode pads were defective and that his testimony was also
inadmissible because it was conclusory. (R. Vol. II, p. 214.)
Black requests that this Court reverse the District Court's order granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. (PL-Appellant's Br.
17.)
EMPI argues that this Court should affirm the District Court's decision.

B.

Course of the Proceedings
Black filed her complaint against defendants DJO Global, Inc.; EMPI; DJO Global, Inc.

dba EMPI, DJO, LLC; and Blackstone Capital Partners V, L.P., on December 19, 2017 (R. Vol. I.
p. 9.) Black alleged that a defect in the EMPI electrode pads burned her. (Id., p. 10.) Defendants
filed their answer on July 20, 2018. (Id., p. 15.) On December 20, 2018, the District Court entered
an order granting the stipulated dismissal of defendant Blackstone Partners V, L.P. (Id., p. 25.)
EMPI took Black's deposition on January 10, 2019 and McDonald's deposition on
February 6, 2019. (Id., p. 77.) Black answered EMPI's first set of interrogatories and requests for
production on August 31, 2018, and EMPI answered Black's first set of discovery on March 18,
2019. (Id., pp. 4-5.)
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On August 29, 2019, EMPI filed the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and an Affidavit of
Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id., pp. 40, 42, 60.)
Black filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
the Affidavit of Bart McDonald on September 26, 2019. (Id., pp. 130 and 140.) On October 4,
2019, EMPI filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and a Supplemental Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Id., pp. 146, 152.)
The District Court heard the motion for summary judgment on October 10, 2019.
At the hearing the District Court noted that some pages were missing from Exhibit F, which
was the manual for the Rich-Mar muscle stimulator that powered the EMPI electrodes used on
Black. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, 11. 2-8.) 4 The District Court gave EMPI's counsel a day or two to submit
a supplemental affidavit to include the missing pages. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, 11. 2-19.) 5
Black's counsel did not object to this procedure.
On October 11, 2019, EMPI filed the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which attached pages 17-20 of the RichMar manual. (R. Vol. I, pp. 157-167.)

4

The original Exhibit F (R., Vol. I, pp. 85-97) was missing pages 17-20.
EMPI's brief contained, verbatim, the warnings from page 18 of the Rich-Mar manual. (Tr. Vol I. pp. 44-45, n.s 3
and 4). While p. 18 was missing from EMPI"s counsel's affidavit, Black knew its contents from EMPI's briefing
more than 28 days before the hearing.
5

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 8

The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary
judgment on October 17, 2019 (id., pp. 163 -169) and entered judgment the same day (Id., p. 171.)
Black filed a Motion to Reconsider on October 31, 2019 supported by a Second Affidavit
of Bart McDonald and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. (Id., pp. 173,
176, 187.) On November 1, 2019, Black filed an Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration. (Id., p. 192.) EMPI filed Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended
Motion to Reconsider on December 31, 2019. (Id., p. 208.)
Black's motion for reconsideration was heard on January 7, 2020. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 3.)
On January 9, 2020, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that
"[u]ltimately, this Court finds no basis to reconsider its prior Decision and Judgment." (R. Vol.
II, p. 214.)

Black timely filed her notice of appeal on February 14, 2020.
C.

Statement of Facts
1.

Linda Black's Medical History

Black was born on

at the time of the

December 21, 2015 bum. (R. Vol. I, pp. 64, 68-69, 71-72, 74-75.) Her medical history included
cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes mellitus, high blood pressure, and obesity. (Id., p. 68.)
J.R. Liljenquist, MD, referred Black to McDonald at Superior Physical Therapy in Idaho
Falls for physical therapy to provide pain relief, decrease inflammation, increase blood flow, and
improve tissue healing. (Id., p. 64.) Among the prescribed modalities was electrical stimulation.
(Id.) McDonald's initial examination of Black took place on December 14, 2015. (Id.)
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2.

McDonald's Background and Training

McDonald was a licensed physical therapist in Idaho and sole owner of Superior Physical
Therapy in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (Id., p. 140.) While McDonald had a master's degree in physical
therapy (id.) and experience administering electro-stimulation as a physical therapist, (id.), he had
no electrical engineering training. (Id., p. 83.) 6
In his deposition, McDonald testified that during his training to become a physical therapist
he was taught how to inspect electrodes for visual defects. (Id., p. 83.) 7 He was only trained to
spot visible defects. (Id., p. 83.) 8 McDonald explained, "[w]hen we see a defective pad, a lot of
times what's occurred is that the wire starts to become pulled out of that carbon portion of the pad
and kind of puckers and dimples." (Id., p. 83.)9 However, McDonald never received any training
or education "as far electrical currents, ohms, voltage, watts." (Id., p. 83.)

10

Black never provided the District Court foundation that McDonald had expertise in the
design and manufacture of either electrode pads or electrical medical devices in general.
3.

Bart McDonald's Treatment of Linda Black

McDonald used a Rich-Mar Winner EVO CM4 SN# 150710004 Muscle Stimulator for
Black's treatment. (Id., p. 155.) McDonald treated Black with the same set of EMPI electrodes

6

Deposition of Bart McDonald (McDonald Depo ), p. 83, 11. 15-17.
McDonald Depo, p. 82, 11. 11-24.
8
McDonald Depo, p. 83, 11. 2-5.
9
McDonald Depo, p. 82, 11. 21-24.
10
McDonald Depo, p. 83, 11. 6-10.

7
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on her lower back on December 14, 2015, December 16, 2015, December 17, 2015, and December
21, 2015. (Id., pp. 155 and 204.) 11
After each treatment, the electrode pads were stored in the original package. (Id., p. 155.)
Black was not burned until her final treatment on December 21, 2015. (Id., p. 204.) 12
On December 21, 2015, the program settings on the Rich-Mar device for Black's treatment
was Quadpolar IFC. (Id., p.155.) The intensity McDonald used for this treatment was 50 mA,
which was the maximum power level on the Rich-Mar muscle stimulator machine. (Id., p. 81.)

13

Before Black's December 21, 2015 treatment McDonald noted "[t] he patient's skin was
clean and ready for treatment." (Id., p. 155.) McDonald simply "[a]pplied the pads to the
appropriate area, lower back and hips at this point." (Id., p. 78.) 14 Neither McDonald's treatment
records nor his Incident Report to EMPI indicated that he moved the electrodes between treatments
or used a barrier between Black's skin and the electrodes as required by the Rich-Mar manual.
When McDonald removed the electrode pads from Black's skin on December 21, 2015, he
noticed a white spot on the right side of her lower back that turned out to be a small burn. 15 (Id.,
p.155.) McDonald did not think that Black seemed concerned at the time of injury. (Id., p. 141.) 16
Black returned two hours after she left Superior Physical Therapy and was advised to seek medical
attention. (Id., p. 141, 205.)

11

See Second Affidavit of Bart McDonald , 9.
See Second Affidavit of Bart McDonald,
13
McDonald Depo, p. 5911. 22-25.
14
McDonald Depo, p. 29, 11. 18-21.
15
On January 8, 2016, McDonald filled out an incident report (entitled "Electrotherapy, TENS I NMES Inquiry")
and recorded that the bum was "2 cm x lcm." (Id. p. 155.)
16
Affidavit of Bart McDonald,

,9.

12

,13.
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In his deposition McDonald testified that he inspected the electrode pads used on Black
and never found a visible defect: "I inspected the pad earlier as I removed the electrode and did
not see any visible wire or pad defect. I kept the pad to see if the company needed to perform any
further inspection for mechanical defect." (Id., p. 78.) 17
4. McDonald Violated the Rich-Mar Manual Instructions by Failing to Place a
Barrier Between Black's Skin and the Electrodes.

The back of the EMPI Carbon CL Electrodes packaging explicitly instructed the user to
consult the manual for the muscle stimulator to be used with the electrodes. The packaging read:
"Warnings: For all contraindications, warnings, precautions, and adverse side effects, refer to

user's manual of the electrotherapy device." (Id., p. 102 (emphasis in original).)
McDonald testified that he had read the Rich-Mar manual and was familiar with it. (Id.,
pp. 79 and 80.) 18 In the Second Affidavit of Bart McDonald, McDonald asserted that he was
"trained to read and interpret the Rich-Mar Instruction Manual pertaining to EMPI Stimcare
Carbon CL Electrodes" and that he had "read and understand[s] the Rich-Mar Instruction Manual
pertaining to EMPI Stimcare Carbon Electrodes, which accompanied the electrode pads used to
treat Linda Black." (Id., pp. 188 and 204.)
McDonald testified that Kirk Doman (the unit's salesman) trained him in the use of the
Rich-Mar units. (Id., p. 79.)

19

McDonald was instructed not to drop the ultrasound head as that

17

McDonaldDepo,p. 31, 11. 21-24.
See McDonald Depo, P. 44, 11. 7-19 and p. 55, 11. 10-17.
19
McDonald Depo, p. 44, 11. 20-23.
18
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would break it. McDonald also testified that in school he was trained not to "go transcranial."
(Id., p. 80.)20

The Rich-Mar Manual contained explicit warnings for when using carbon electrode pads
and when using any pad with current outputs above 40 mA.
Page 16 of the Rich-Mar Manual warned:
CAUTION: When using carbon electrodes with any Rich-Mar
stimulator, a moistened interface (cloth or sponge) MUST be
utilized between these electrodes and patient to avoid skin irritation
and/or electrical bums.
(Id., p. 97.)

Additionally, Precautions, ,r 6, at page 18 of the Rich-Mar Manual provided:
When using this device at current outputs above 40mA, extra
caution should be observed to avoid bums by using an adequate
conductive medium and by frequently using an alternate electrode
placement.
(Id., p. 160.)

McDonald never followed the Rich-Mar manual's warning, which he admitted in his
Second Affidavit.
From my experience and training no moistened interface is required
when administering the treatment I was using for Linda Black.
I have never used a moisture barrier when administering similar
treatments, with similar machines, and similar electrode pads. 21

20

21

McDonald Depo, p. 55, 1. 18.
Id. p. 204 (Second Affidavit of McDonald, , 6 and 7).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 13

5.

The Rich-Mar Manual Noted Burns Can Be a Side Effect of Treatment
The Rich-Mar manual also noted that bums underneath electrodes are associated

with the use of muscle stimulators. Page 18 of the Rich-Mar Manual, "Adverse Reactions," stated,
NOTE: Skin irritation and bums beneath the electrodes have been
reported with the use of muscle stimulators.
(Id., p. 160 (emphasis in original).)

6.

Black Submitted No Evidence of a Defect

McDonald kept the electrode pads but someone in his office later threw them out. (Id., p.
177, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 17.) Accordingly, no inspection
or testing of the pads used on Black was ever done.
Even though Black's counsel obtained numerous affidavits from McDonald to oppose
EMPI' s motion for summary judgment, McDonald never presented evidence of a specific design
or manufacturing defect. The only facts put into the record by McDonald support the conclusion
that the electrodes were not defective, as he testified that he visually inspected them and saw
nothing wrong. (R. Vol. I. pp. 78 and 83.) 22

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

EMPI is not raising additional issues for appeal.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

EMPI does not seek costs and fees on appeal.

22

McDonald Depo, p. 31, 11. 21-23 and p. 81, 11. 19-23.
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined That There Was No Admissible Evidence
That EMPl's Electrode Pads Were Defective.

The District Court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact
that the EMPI electrode pads were defective. EMPI established the absence of evidence of defect,
shifting the burden of proof to Black to show that there was a genuine issue for trial. Heath v.
Jonker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 254, 1255 (2000).

There are three general categories of strict liability in product liability cases manufacturing defect, design defect, or failure to warn. Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107
Idaho 836, 839, 693 P.2d 1038, 1041 (1984).
Regardless of whether a cause of action is based upon negligence or strict liability, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the product in question was defective; (2) the defect existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control; and (3) that the defective product was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Puckett v. Oalifabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 979 P.2d
1174, 1179 (1999); Farmer v. Internat'l Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306, 1310 (1976)
(elements of prima facie case are the same regardless of negligence theory or strict liability theory).
To prove a prima facie case, a plaintiff must not only show that the product was defective
and unreasonably dangerous, but there must be a lack of evidence of abnormal use and the absence
of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant.
Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). 23

23

Later case law seems to confine the "lack of evidence of abnormal use " and "absence of reasonable secondary
causes" requirements to circumstantial cases. Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332, 343 P. 2d 397, 398 (1992).
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In general, an action based on strict liability "focuses on the condition of the product after
manufacturing and the consumer's expectation," while an "action based on negligence is
concerned with the conduct and behavior of the manufacturer." Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125
Idaho 145, 148, 868 P.2d 473, 476 (1994) (citations omitted). Regardless of the theory under
which recovery is sought in a products liability action, a plaintiff must establish that the injury is
causally related to the defendant's act or omission. Mica Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline
Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 411, 546 P.2d 54, 57 (1975).

Last, "[T]he plaintiff will not carry his burden of proof by merely proving the fact of the
occurrence of an accident." Farmer, 97 Idaho at 749, 553 P.2d at 1313.
1. Black Produced No Evidence Of A Specific Malfunction

"A circumstantial evidence showing under the Farmer case [requires] proof of: ( 1) the
malfunction of the product; (2) the lack of evidence of abnormal use; and (3) proof excluding the
possibility of other 'reasonable causes."' Doty, 123 Idaho at 332, 848 P.2d at 390.
Here, Black never presented admissible evidence that the EMPI electrode pads
malfunctioned. This Court has long held that a distinction need not be drawn between a "defect"
and a "malfunction." Farmer, 97 Idaho at 748, 553 P.2d at 1312. "Proof of malfunction is
circumstantial evidence of a defect in a product since a product will not ordinarily malfunction
within the reasonable contemplation of a consumer in the absence of a defect." Id. Related to the
proof of a malfunction is proof that the event in question is not caused by any abnormal
use. Id. "Additionally related is evidence which tends to eliminate reasonable secondary
causes." Id. "Ordinarily a plaintiff will have to rely upon circumstantial evidence and the
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inferences arising therefrom based on expert opinion testimony on the condition of the product
after the accident." Id., 97 Idaho at 1311, 553 P.2d at 747.
Black did not show that the bum she suffered was anything other than a known and
contemplated potential side effect of electrical stimulation therapy. The Rich-Mar manual
specifically noted that "[ s]kin irritation and bums beneath the electrodes have been reported with
the use of muscle stimulators." (R. Vol. I, p. 160.) The manual's warnings that a barrier between
the skin and carbon electrodes was necessary to prevent burning, and that the operator should
alternate placement of the electrodes to prevent burning, further underlines that burning was a
known and contemplated potential side effect of electrical stimulation therapy.
Having presented no evidence that her bum was anything other than a side effect of her
treatment, Black necessarily failed to establish a product malfunction under Farmer. Accordingly,
the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to EMPI.

2. Black Presented No Evidence Excluding McDonald's Failure To Follow The RichMar Manual's Warnings As The Cause Of Her Burn.
Black never refuted the District Court's conclusion that there was "abnormal use" of the
electrode pads and other "reasonable secondary causes" for Black's bum. 24 Doty, 123 Idaho at
332, 848 P. 2d. at 390. Specifically, EMPI showed (a) that McDonald failed to use a moistened
interface such as a cloth or sponge between the electrode pads and Black's skin as required by the
Rich-Mar manual; (b) that McDonald failed to move the placement of the electrode pads on

24

R. Vol. I, p. 169 ("Here, there is evidence of not only abnormal use of the electrode pads but also reasonable
probability of a secondary cause").
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Black's skin over the course of Black's treatment as instructed in the Rich-Mar Manual; and (c)
that burning is a side effect of using muscle stimulators. (R. Vol. I, pp. 97 and 160.)
Page 16 of the Rich-Mar Manual contained the following warning:
CAUTION: When using carbon electrodes with any Rich-Mar
stimulator, a moistened interface (cloth or sponge) MUST be
utilized between these electrodes and patient to avoid skin
irritation and/or electrical bums.

(Id., p. 97.)
According to page 18 of the Rich-Mar Manual,
When using this device at current outputs above 40mA, extra
caution should be observed to avoid bums by using an adequate
conductive medium and by frequently using an alternate
electrode placement.

(Id., p. 160.)
On the date of Black's bum, December 21, 2015, McDonald set the Rich-Mar muscle
stimulator to an intensity of 50A. (Id., p. 155.) Even though the Rich-Mar Manual mandated the
use of a moistened interface between carbon electrode pads and Black's skin, McDonald did not
use one. (Id., p. 155.) McDonald noted that Plaintiff's "skin was clean and ready for treatment"
before he applied the electrode pads to Plaintiff's "low back and hips." (Id., p. 155.) He applied
the electrode pads directly to Black's skin with no barrier and confirmed he never used a barrier
on any patient in his career. (R. Vol. 1, p. 204 (McDonald Second Affidavit, ,r,r 6 and 7)).
Furthermore, while the Rich-Mar Manual warned to use an adequate "conductive medium"
and frequently alter electrode placement on settings over 40 mA, McDonald did neither even
though he set the Rich-Mar machine at 50mA, its highest setting.
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The District Court correctly granted summary judgment because Black did not refute that
McDonald's failure to follow the manual was a reasonable secondary cause of her bum.
Last, Black never presented evidence showing that the bum was the result of a product
defect rather than simply a side effect of treatment. The Rich-Mar Manual states, "NOTE: Skin
irritation and bums beneath the electrodes have been reported with the use of muscle stimulators."
(Id., p. 160.)

Because Black never refuted that one reasonable secondary cause was the mere use of the
product, which was known to cause bums, the District Court appropriately granted summary
judgment.
3.

The District Court Correctly Determined That McDonald Was Not Qualified
To Opine That There Was A Design Or Manufacturing Defect That Caused
The Burn.

In a products liability case "expert testimony may be required when the facts are beyond
the experience of most jurors." Hansen-Rice, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d 970,974 (D.
Idaho 2006) (Winmill, C.J.) 25 (citing Jensen v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Idaho 460, 464-65,
35 P.3d 776, 780-81 (2001 )). By presenting opinions from McDonald, Black conceded she needed
a qualified expert to show that the EMPI electrode pads were defective. The EMPI electrode pads
were complex medical devices, particularly considering their use with a complex electrical
stimulator such as the Rich-Mar unit.

25

This Court has long held that a product defect must typically be proven by expert testimony. Farmer, 97 Idaho at
1311, 553 P.2d at 747.
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The only way for Black to prove a design or manufacturing defect was through an I.R.E.
702 qualified expert.
Numerous courts have recognized that a plaintiff typically cannot demonstrate that a
medical device is defective in the absence of competent expert proof. See e.g., Hughes v. Stryker

Corp., 423 Appx. 878,881 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's finding that "the interaction
between a complex and technical medical device and the unique physiological and medical
circumstances of the patient in which it is implanted is a subject on which no ordinary juror could
rationally be expected to have knowledge"); Cothren v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
779, 782-83 (S.D. Miss 2011).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 describes the foundation necessary to qualify an expert. It
provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the tier of act to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
I.R.E. 702.
Trial courts "broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert."

Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007). Determining
whether expert testimony is admissible "is also a matter committed to the discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion." Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153
P.3d at 1183 (citing Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 897, 903 (2005). See Hurtado

v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 16-17, 278 P.3d 415, 418-19 (2012) (dismissing design and
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manufacturing defect claims in medical device case due to plaintiffs failure to present expert
testimony).
Black tried to qualify McDonald as a design and manufacturing expert but only established
his expertise as a physical therapist in administering electrical stimulation therapy. Black presented
no foundation qualifying McDonald in the design or manufacture of electrode pads or electrical
devices in general.
In this case, the District Court correctly determined that McDonald was not qualified as an
expert to testify the electrodes were defective because he had no expertise in the design and
manufacture of electrodes. In its October 17, 2019 Memorandum Decision and Order, the District
Court explained,
There is nothing in the record which identifies McDonald as having
any expertise in the design and manufacturing of electrodes. While
McDonald may clearly testify regarding his actions and
observations at the time in question as well as his prior experience,
he is not qualified to make the conclusion that the electrodes in this
matter were defective, with one possible exception.

(Id., p. 165.)
It should be noted that McDonald is likely qualified to visually
inspect an electrode to see whether there is a loose wire or some
other abnormality. Mc Donald has the experience to note when an
electrode visually appears abnormal. However, McDonald's visual
inspection revealed a normal looking electrode. Beyond a visual
inspection, McDonald does not have the expertise or qualification
to proffer admissible testimony to the effect that the electrodes were
defective. As such, the conclusion by McDonald that the electrodes
were defective is inadmissible and will not be considered by the
Court.

(Id., pp. 165-66.)
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Black did nothing to change the District Court's mind on the motion for reconsideration as
Black submitted nothing to qualify McDonald as a design or manufacturing expert. In the January
9, 2020 order on Black's motion for reconsideration, the District Court declared that it
"continue[d] to find that McDonald is not qualified to testify as to whether there was a latent
defect in the electrode pads." (R. Vol. II, p. 214.)
The instant case is not unlike Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Wins low, 110 Idaho 615, 616,
717 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1986), where this Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by a fire
investigator who did not qualify to testify regarding electricity because he did not meet I.R.E.
702' s foundational requirements.
In upholding the District Court this Court explained:
Hamilton Drug next asserts that the court erred in its refusal to allow
Fire Chief Hosack to testify as an expert in the area of electricity.
We note that the instant trial was held prior to the adoption of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence. Admissibility of expert opinion testimony
is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Stoddard v. Nelson, 99
Idaho 293,581 P.2d 339 (1978). We find no abuse of that discretion
in the instant case. It was shown that Hosack had no formal training
in electricity although he had practical experience and had attended
numerous seminars in.fire-cause investigation. However, he was not
a licensed electrician, was not qualified to inspect wiring, had no
knowledge about the metallurgy involved in electrical wiring, and
had taken no courses in electricity. While practical experience, as
opposed to formal training, can qualify a witness as an expert, Bean
v. Diamond Alkali Company, 93 Idaho 32,454 P.2d 69 (1969), the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Hosack was
not qualified as an expert in electricity.
Id. at 619, 717 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).
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In this case, Black never showed that McDonald had expenence m the design or
manufacture of electrode pads or electrical medical devices in general.
Like the fire chief in Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, who was not qualified to
testify about electricity, McDonald was not qualified to testify that the EMPI electrode pads were
defective.
This Court has held for decades that a products liability plaintiff must show that a product
has been defectively designed and/or defectively manufactured. Accordingly, an expert who
wishes to qualify under IRE 702 in a product liability case must show product design qualifications
and/or product manufacturing qualifications. McDonald had no such qualifications here. The
District Court acted within its discretion when it excluded his opinions.
4.

McDonald's Conclusory And Unqualified Opinions Did Not Create An Issue
Of Fact And He Never Addressed His Failure To Follow The Rich-Mar
Manual's Warnings.

The District Court correctly rejected McDonald's conclusory and unsupported theories.
"When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider
material which would be admissible at trial." Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 P.3d 172, 176 (2007). As a rule,
"[ s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Thus, an
affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, or not supported
by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of
I.R.C.P. 56(e) . State v. Shama Resources Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho
267,271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995).
Taft v. Jumbo Foods, Inc., 155 Idaho 511,515,314 P.3d 193, 197 (2013) (emphasis added).
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"A statement is conclusory if it does not contain supporting evidence for its assertion."
Eldridge v. West, 266 Idaho 303, 458 P.3d 172, 180 (2020). In Eldridge v. West, this Court

determined,
The affidavits of West and Turpin are undoubtedly conclusory.
There is nothing in either that explains the basis for the conclusions:
"In providing care and treatment for Mr. Eldridge's right hip, there
is nothing I did or allegedly failed to do that caused the damages
alleged in the Eldridges' complaint."
Id. at 181.

The facts and opinions relied upon by Black to argue that there was a disputed issue of
material fact can be summarized as such: 1. The "defective pad" used on Black belonged to a
group of pads from the same lot that "showed the same defects when used." (Plaintiff-Appellant's
Brief, p. 5,

,r

6.) 2. McDonald administered the therapy in a "proper manner" following the

manufacturer's instructions. (Id., p. 5, ,r 8.) 3. McDonald stated he "knows of no other rational
explanation why Linda Black received bums other than these electrode pads were defective . .
." (Id., p. 5, ,r 9.) 4. During his career McDonald administered electro therapy 296,400 times and

the only bums he saw "were caused by electrode therapy pads from the same lot, 501659, as the
pads which injured Linda Black." (Id., p. 14, (citing R. Vol. I, p. 205.)
There were numerous flaws with McDonald's theories.
First, as noted, the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion under IRE 702 in
excluding McDonald from opining that the electrode pads were "defective." Black laid no
foundation qualifying McDonald under IRE 702 as a design or manufacturing expert.
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Second, while McDonald offered the conclusory statement in his affidavits that he followed
the manufacturer's instructions, it was undisputed that he did not. He did not place a barrier
between the electrode pads and Black's skin, he did not use a "conductive medium" between the
pads and Black's skin, and he did not move the pads around over the course of Black's
treatment. He placed the pads directly on Black's skin and did not move the pads around, which
the manual expressly warned could result in bums. McDonald's "no other rational explanation"
opinion (putting aside his lack of qualifications to make it) is conclusory and insufficient to rebut
these other "reasonable causes" for the bum.
Third, the Rich-Mar manual noted that bums are sometimes a side effect of electrical
stimulation therapy. Again, McDonald's "no other rational explanation" opinion (putting aside
his lack of qualifications to make it) is conclusory and insufficient to rebut this other "reasonable
cause" for the bum, i.e., that the bum was a recognized side effect.
Fourth, Black laid no foundation for the opinion that the number of times he administered
electro therapy without burning, and that other pads from the same lot also burned patients, shows
the EMPI electrode pads were defective. There was no foundation for the opinion that this simple
math - putting aside that McDonald was not qualified to opine on a design or manufacturing defect
- is evidence of a design or manufacturing defect. There was - and remains - no dispute that
McDonald never followed the Rich-Mar manual's warnings, vitiating the position that the
purported bums by other pads from the same lot of pads is necessarily evidence of a
defect. McDonald's admission that he never followed the Rich-Mar manual simply establishes
that his use of the EMPI pads, on Black and other patients, was "abnormal" and that there were
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other "reasonable explanations" for the bum, i.e., McDonald's willful refusal to follow the RichMar manual.
Accepting the above arguments, as EMPI contends this Court should, Black's case
amounted to the position that because she was burned the EMPI pads had to have been defective,
a position unsupported by Idaho law. Farmer, 97 Idaho at 749,553 P.2d at 1313 (merely proving
the occurrence of an accident does not prove defect). While this Court has long instructed Idaho
litigants that product defect and/or malfunction typically is proven by expert testimony, Id., at 747,
553 P.2d at 1311, McDonald never qualified to render such an opinion in this case.
B.

The District Court Did Not Err In Determining That The Doctrine Of Res Ipsa
Loquitur Did Not Apply To Black's Case.

The District Court correctly concluded that res ipsa loquitur was not a viable theory of
recovery.
This Court has identified the elements of a product liability claim for decades and never
suggested that res ipsa is an appropriate or recognized method to prove a product liability claim.
This Court should therefore reject Black's attempt to expand res ipsa loquitur to product liability
cases.
Even assuming the doctrine applies, the District Court appropriately granted summary
judgement. The elements are as follows:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a method of establishing
negligence by means of "inferences, rather than direct proof."
Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 355, 597 P.2d 595, 598
(1979). When applicable, it "creates an inference of the breach of the
duty imposed and replaces direct evidence with a permissive
inference of negligence." Id. (citations omitted). Two elements must
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exist before res ipsa loquitur applies in a particular case: (1) "the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury must be under the
exclusive control and management of the defendant," and (2) "the
circumstances must be such that common knowledge and experience
would justify the inference that the accident would not have
happened in the absence of negligence." Id. (citations omitted).
Application of the doctrine is "limited to those cases which are
within the common knowledge and experience of the average
layperson." Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 334,
940 P.2d 1142, 1153 (1997).
In addition to these two requirements, this Court has held that "[i]t
is also necessary that the cause of the injury point[ s] to the
defendant's negligence." S.H Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho
614,617,515 P.2d 561,564 (1973) (citations omitted). In other
words, "[t]he mere happening of an accident does not dispense with
the requirement that the injured party must make some showing that
the defendant against whom relief is sought was in some manner
negligent, where there are other probable causes of the injury."
Christensen, 100 Idaho at 355, 597 P.2d at 598. Therefore, to
proceed under res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
instrumentality which caused his injury was under the exclusive
control and management of the defendant and that the circumstances
would permit an average layperson to infer, based upon common
knowledge and experience, that the plaintiff would not have suffered
those injuries in the absence of the defendant's negligence.
Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 566, 272 P.3d 534, 538 (2012) (emphasis added).

The only function of res ipsa loquitur is to replace direct evidence of negligence with a
permissive inference of negligence:
'It furnishes circumstantial evidence of defendant's negligence

where direct evidence may be lacking. The burdens of proof of the
parties remain the same-the plaintiff, with the aid of the inference,
must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence; if the
plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to get to the jury, the defendant
is obligated to produce evidence to explain or rebut plaintiffs prima
facie case. If he fails to do so, he will in most instances suffer a
verdict against him. In all cases, however, the preponderance of the

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 27

plaintiffs evidence is a question for the trier of facts.' (Citations
omitted).
Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 934-35, 523 P.2d 536, 537-38 (1974).
1.

Because The Electrode Pads Were Not Under The Exclusive Control OfEMPI,
The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary Judgment.

Black incorrectly argues that EMPI had exclusive control over the electrode pads. As the
District Court correctly stated in the October 17, 2019 Memorandum Decision and Order,
[I]t is undisputed that Black received electrotherapy treatment from
McDonald three separate times on three separate days leading up to
December 21, 2015. (Evett Affidavit, Exhibits A-C, Black Medical
Records). Black came in for treatment on December 14, 16, and 17
and McDonald used the same carbon electrode pads on Black on
December 21 that he used on at least two of those previous days.
(Evett Affidavit, Exhibit E, McDonald Depo, pg. 80, 11. 3-7).
(R. Vol. I, p. 167.)
The EMPI carbon electrode pads were not under the "exclusive control and management"
ofEMPI, as required. Enriquez, 152 Idaho at 566,272 P.3d at 538. McDonald had treated Black
with the same set of electrode pads on December 14, 2015, December 16, 2015, December 17,
2015, and December 21, 2015. (R. Vol. I., pp. 155 and 204.) After each treatment, these electrode
pads were stored in the original package at room temperature. (Id., p. 155.) Moreover, McDonald
was not the only person to apply these electrode pads to Black. McDonald's physical therapy
assistant Jennifer Ellsworth applied the electrode pads to Black's skin during Black's treatment on
December 16, 2015. (Id., p. 80.)26

26

McDonald Depo, p. 53, 11. 3-9.
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In addition, in her brief, Black concedes that "McDonald was in control of the electrode
pads at the time of the injury." (PL-Appellant's Br. 11.)
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's determination that Black
could not establish that Defendants had exclusive control over the electrode pads.
2.

Black Could Not Satisfy The Second Res Ipsa Loquitur Prong Because The
"Average Layperson" Does Not Have Experience In The Design And
Manufacture Of Electrical Medical Devices.

An alternative basis for upholding the District Court is that Black could not show that "the
circumstances would permit an average layperson to infer, based upon common knowledge and
experience, that the plaintiff would not have suffered those injuries in the absence of the
defendant's negligence." Enriquez, 152 Idaho at 562, 272 P.3d at, 538.
As in Enrique v. Idaho Power Co., this case "would require the trier of fact to possess and
apply specific technical information, which is outside of common knowledge and experience." Id.
at 568, 272 P.3d at 540. The "average layperson" does not have experience in the design and
manufacture of electrical medical devices. The determination of whether carbon electrode pads
being used with a complex electro-stimulator were defective is not "within the common knowledge
and experience of the average layperson." Id. at 566,272 P.3d at 538.
Because an average layperson was not qualified to conclude that Black's bum would not
have occurred in the absence of EMPI' s negligence res ipsa loquitur was not a viable claim.
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3.

Because McDonald's Failure To Follow The Warnings And Instructions
Contained In The Rich-Mar Manual Was A Likely Cause Of Black's Burn,
Res Ipsa Loquitur Did Not Apply.

Finally, res ipsa loquitur does not apply because a probable cause of Black's bum was
McDonald's failure to adhere to the warnings and instructions contained in the Rich-Mar manual.
In S. H Kress & Co. v. Godman, appellant argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied
to the explosion of a boiler. Appellant had alleged that the negligence of the defendant-respondent
in the repair of the boiler had caused the explosion. 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).

This Court explained,
An essential element in the application of res ipsa loquitur is the
conclusion that the occurrence in the ordinary course of things
would not happen unless someone had been negligent. Hale v.
Heninger, 87 Idaho 414, 422, 393 P.2d 718 (1964) ; Restatement
(Second) of Torts, s 328D, comment c. It is also necessary that the
cause of the injury point to the defendant's negligence. Restatement
(Second) of Torts, supra, comments e, f, and g; Prosser, Torts, s 39
(4th ed. 1971). In this case there are other probable explanations of
the cause of the boiler's explosion including the appellant's
negligence in the control of maintenance of the boiler. For this
reason, the trial court correctly concluded that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
S. H Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho at 617,515 P.2d at 564.

In Christensen v. Potratz, this Court further clarified,
By affirming the conclusion of the trial court that res ipsa loquitur
was not applicable in Kress, this Court did not hold that the appellant
therein was barred from the use of the doctrine only because of his
own possible negligence, but rather that where there are other
possible explanations of the cause of an explosion, it is necessary
that the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence pointing to the
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defendant's negligence as a cause of the injury, in order to apply res
ipsa loquitur to that defendant. Where any one of a number of
persons, wholly independent of each other, may be responsible for
an injury, the case is one for affirmative proof and not for
presumption by way of res ipsa loquitur. 31 Am.Jur.2d Explosions
and Explosives, Sec. 107 p. 881; 38 A.L.R.2d 911 Sec. 3(c);
Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company, 3 Utah 2d 283,282 P.2d
1044 (1955). See also Fireman's Fund American Insurance
Companies v. Knobbe, 562 P.2d 825 (Nev.1977).
100 Idaho 352, 355-56, 597 P.2d 595, 598-99 (1979).
Here, Black never ruled out the possibility of negligence on the part of third parties, i.e.
McDonald, being the cause of Black's bum. Nor did Black rule out that her bum was merely a
side effect of the treatment.
As in Christensen v. Potratz, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment due
to the inability of Black to "explain away the other probable theories that may have accounted for
the cause of' Black's bum. Id. at 356, 597 P.2d at 599.
C.

Black Waived Any Objections To The Rich-Mar Manual.

Black belatedly argues that the Rich-Mar manual was inadmissible. However, Black
waived her objections to the manual by not objecting before or at the first summary judgment
hearing.
Until the hearing on Black's motion for reconsideration Black's counsel never objected to
the Rich-Mar manual. The latest a party can object to evidence on summary judgment is at oral
argument on the motion. Gem State Ins., Co., v. Hatchison, Ins., 145 Idaho 10,15, 175 3 P. 3d 172,
177 (2007). See also AJA Servs. Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 136 Idaho 184, 188, 30 P.3d
962,966 (2001) (citing State v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353,357,924 P.2d 615, 619 (1996)).
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("[A ]n issue may be considered waived if raised for the first time m a motion for
reconsideration."')
Black never objected to admission of the manual in her summary judgment filing or at the
first summary judgment hearing. It was not until the hearing on Black's motion for reconsideration
that counsel objected:
And that manual's not a self-authenticating document either, so that
can't be taken as evidence. You know, Your Honor, we can't crossexamine that manual. Now, we need an expert to get on the standard
and we can ask questions of.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 21, LI. 11-16.)
Because Black never objected to the admission of the Rich-Mar manual in her response to
EMPI' s initial summary judgment filings or at the October 10, 2019 oral argument, Black waived
any objection to the Rich-Mar manual.
The Court should also reject Black's argument that the District Court should not have
considered the missing pages from the Rich-Mar manual. While it is true that pages 17-20 were
missing at the October 10, 2019 summary judgment hearing,

27

the District Court gave EMPI

permission to submit those after the hearing. EMPI filed those pages in the Second Supplemental
Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on October
11, 2019.

27

Page 18 from the Rich-Mar manual was quoted verbatim by EMPI in its summary judgment brief. (R. Vol. I, pp.
44-45, n.s. 3 and 4.) There was accordingly no prejudice to Black and omission of the pages did not affect her
substantial rights. I.R.E. 103.
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Black's counsel was present at the hearing on EMPI's motion for summary judgment when
the District Court gave EMPI permission to file a supplemental affidavit to include the missing
pages.
Counsel did not object. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 12-13.)
Counsel also did not object at the end of the hearing when the District Court reiterated that
it was going to give the Defendants a couple of days to supplement the record. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 18.)
At the end of the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: ... I'll give you a day or two to supplement the record with
those missing pages. That's just basically assuming that's a clerical mistake.
MR. EVETT: Yep.
THE COURT: And then I'll consider the matter submitted. So I'll take this
under advisement. I plan on issuing a written decision as soon as I can.
Anything else at this time, Mr. Evett?
MR. EVETT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Browning?
MR. BROWNING: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. EVETT: Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded)
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, 11. 6-23 (emphasis added).)
Also, because the missing pages from the Rich-Mar manual (in particular page 18) were
quoted verbatim in EMPI' s summary judgment briefing, the District Court's decision to permit
EMPI to submit the pages after the hearing did not affect Black's substantial rights. Accordingly,
the District Court's decision was not error.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that "[ e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected." I.R.E. 103(a). Similarly, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
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which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." I.R.C.P. 61. Thus, this
Court has held that in cases where "a trial court errs in the admission or exclusion
of evidence, we will grant a new trial only if the error affected a substantial right."
State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. P'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 726, 228
P.3d 985,993 (2010) (citing I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P. 61; Burgess v. Salmon River Canal
Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)).
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012).

Because Black did not object to the late admission of the pages, and because the late
submission did not affect her substantial rights since EMPI' s brief discussed the content of the
missing pages, the District Court's consideration of the missing pages was not error.
This Court should also reject Black's argument based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b)(3)(A), which covers the form of motions and other papers. (PL-Appellant's Br. 16.) Because
this was summary judgment the proper rule is I.R.C.P. 56.
Under I.R.C.P. 56(b)(3) "[t]he court may alter. .. the time periods and requirements of this
rule for good cause shown." In Bennett v. Bliss, "[the Plaintiff] Bennett [argued] that the court
erred by giving [defendant] Richards a continuance before hearing Bennet' s motion for summary
judgment, because I.R.C.P. 56 does not require that an answer be filed or discovery be completed
before such a motion is filed." 103 Idaho 358,360, 647 P.2d 814, 816 (Ct. App. 1982). The Court
of Appeals determined,
A motion for an extension of time to file additional affidavits,
depositions, and interrogatories in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment lies within the discretion of the district court.
Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 418-19, 599 P.2d 985, 989-90
(1979). The district court's order reflects sound reasoning for
granting a continuance for purposes of allowing discovery. We do
not find an abuse of discretion.
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Id. at 360, 647 P.2d at 816.

The District Court acted within its discretion by permitting filing of the missing pages,
which was accomplished the next day. Furthermore, as noted, Black never objected.
Finally, Black waived any objections to submission of the missing pages because she relied
on the manual in opposing summary judgment. (R. Vol. I., pp. 200 and 204-05.) For example, in
Black's November 1, 2019 Amended Memorandum Supporting Black's Motion for
Reconsideration, Black argued that McDonald "administered the therapy in accordance with the
Rich-Mar manual." (Id., p. 200.) McDonald also asserted in the Second Affidavit of Bart
McDonald, "The Rich-Mar Instruction Manual pertaining to EMPI Stimcare Carbon CL
Electrodes states that for the Interferential waveform therapy I used on Linda Black, that 50 MhA
was the appropriate setting." (Id., p. 205.)
In the Second Affidavit of Bart McDonald, McDonald stated that he was "trained to read
and interpret the Rich-Mar Instruction Manual pertaining to EMPI Stimcare Carbon CL
Electrodes" and that he "read and understand[s] the Rich-Mar Instruction Manual pertaining to
EMPI Stimcare Carbon Electrodes, which accompanied the electrode pads used to treat Linda
Black." (Id., p. 204.) Black also asserted in Black's November 1, 2019 amended memorandum
supporting Black's motion for reconsideration that McDonald was "trained in reading the manual
and applying its instructions." (Id., p. 200.)
For these reasons, this Court should conclude that it was proper for the District Court to
admit the Rich-Mar manual as an exhibit. Black did not timely object and she opposed the
summary judgment by relying on the manual to convince the District Court McDonald had to
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complied with it. Late submission of a few missing pages from the Rich-Mar manual did not affect
her substantive or rights since the relevant language from the manual was discussed in EMPI' s
briefing.

D.

Black Never Raised A Warranty Claim Below, Waiving The Argument On Appeal.
For the first time in this case Black argues on appeal that summary judgment was erroneous

because she can prove breach of implied warranty. (PL-Appellant's Br. 13-14.) This claim is too
late.

Appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time
on appeal. Green v. Young, 102 Idaho 735, 639 P.2d 433 (1981) ;
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88
(1962). Where issues were not presented to the trial court by
pleadings or evidence touching on particular questions, such
questions are not properly before this Court for determination upon
review. Miller v. Miller, 88 Idaho 57, 396 P.2d 476 (1964). Parties
are held to the theory upon which the case was tried in lower court.
Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968).
Marchbanks v. Roll 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (emphasis added).
Black did not include a warranty claim in the complaint. Black only alleged that a defect
that existed in the electrode pad when it left EMPI' s control caused Plaintiff to be burned during
electrotherapy. (R. Vol. I, p. 10.) In addition, Black never raised a warranty claim in any of the
briefs or at any of the hearings.
Because Black did not raise and litigate the claim below it cannot be raised now.
Moreover, there never was an express or implied warranty that the electrode pads would
work for ten applications. The packaging for the EMPI Carbon CL Electrodes did not mention a
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specific of number of applications for which the electrode pads should work. The "Instructions
for Application and Removal of Electrodes" on the back of the packaging for the EMPI Carbon
CL Electrodes state, "For single patient use only. The electrodes may be repositioned up to several
times on the same patient." (Id., p. 102.) Moreover, the back of the of the packaging for the EMPI
Carbon CL Electrodes also declares, "NOTE: The life of the electrode varies depending on skin
conditions, skin preparation, type of stimulation, storage and climate." (Id., p. 102.) This note
thus refutes Black's assertion that there was any implied warranty that the electrodes would work
for any specific number of applications.
While this Court should not consider the issue of an implied warranty because it was
brought up for the first time on appeal, it is also true that no such implied warranty for how many
applications the electrode pads "should work" exists.
V.

CONCLUSION

EMPI respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the October 17, 2019 Memorandum
Decision and Order granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; the October 17,
2019 Judgment; and the January 9, 2020 order denying Black's motion for reconsideration.
DATED THIS 11 th day of September, 2020.
DUKE EVETT, PLLC

By Isl Joshua S. Evett
Joshua S. Evett- Of the Firm
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
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